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Military Spouse Appreciation

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Military Spouse Appreciation
April 29, 2022 | By Defense.gov
The Defense Department recognizes the strength and contributions of our nearly 1 million military spouses and offers extra support and activities focused on real-world needs on Military Spouse Appreciation Day each May, and year-round.

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DOD Celebrates Military Spouse Appreciation Day

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A couple embraces.

DOD Celebrates Military Spouse Appreciation Day
April 29, 2022 | By David Vergun
This year’s Military Spouse Appreciation Day is May 6.

Traditionally, it is the Friday before Mother’s Day, building on the idea that 92% of military spouses are female, C. Eddy Mentzer, associate director of military community support programs for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy, said.

Although the commemoration is only for a day, installations around the globe have a variety of spouse appreciation events throughout the month, as do many military and veteran service organizations.

Military OneSource has a variety of events on various days in May. Mentzer said the premier Military OneSource event this month is a three-day virtual symposium specifically designed for the military spouse community, scheduled for May 10 to 12.

Activities planned for that virtual symposium include:

  • Sesame Street for Military Families
  • Career building skills
  • Discovering your talent
  • Personal branding
  • Job search tips
  • Finding the right balance in life
  • Tips on thriving in the workplace
  • Money-saving ideas
  • How to become an entrepreneur
  • Guide to stronger relationships

“With a million military spouses across the active and reserve components, that’s a million individual stories,” Mentzer said, referring to the unique life experiences of each of those spouses.

“That’s something as a department that we have to really recognize. While we can’t solve every challenge, we have to listen to those unique individual stories,” he said.

Military spouses are important for several reasons, Mentzer said, including manning the home front when the service member is deployed and providing moral and emotional support.

Knowing that the military is taking good care of spouses and families has a major impact on troop morale and readiness, he said. It also factors in their decision on whether to reenlist.

Mentzer can speak authoritatively about military spouses because he’s been one for 21 years and still is. He has also been at the forefront of military family readiness for more than 30 years as a federal civilian, spending more than a decade working in the office of the secretary of defense.

His wife, Eries, an Air Force colonel, is the wing commander of Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama. They have one child, Jaxson, who is 11.

“One of the things we talk about quite often is focusing on having complementing, not competing careers. And you know, it is doable. It’s not easy. We’ve each had to make sacrifices. But we’ve also been able to achieve quite a great deal,” he said.

Mentzer mentioned that military life must have rubbed off on Jaxson, whose goal is to be a military broadcast journalist. He turns 12 this month so in just a few years that goal will be within reach.

Visit the Military Spouse Appreciation Month page for resources and information and to register for the symposium.

About Military Community and Family Policy

Military Community and Family Policy is directly responsible for establishing and overseeing quality-of-life policies and programs that help our service members, their families and survivors be well and mission-ready. Military OneSource is the gateway to programs and services that support the everyday needs of the 5.2 million service members and immediate family members of the military community. These Defense Department services can be accessed 24/7/365 around the world.

More About Military Spouse Appreciation Day

On April 17, 1984, President Ronald Reagan established Military Spouse Appreciation Day with Proclamation 5184, recognizing the countless sacrifices and contributions made by military spouses since the days of the Continental Army and Navy.

In 1999, Congress officially made Military Spouse Appreciation Day part of National Military Appreciation Month to recognize the many sacrifices military spouses make as they put their personal and professional aspirations aside for their service member.

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Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing

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Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby Holds a Press Briefing
April 29, 2022
PRESS SECRETARY JOHN F. KIRBY: Good afternoon. Normally, I get a “good afternoon” back, but I guess we’re all tired.

(CROSSTALK)

MR. KIRBY: Yeah, yeah. All right. I have a couple things at the top today.

Today, I can announce that the United States has commenced training with the Ukrainian Armed Forces on key systems at U.S. military installations in Germany. Now, these efforts build on the initial artillery training that Ukraine’s forces already have received elsewhere, and also includes training on the radar systems and armored vehicles that have been recently announced as part of security assistance packages. U.S. Army Europe and Africa Command will organize this training in coordination with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and we’re grateful, of course, for Germany’s continued support.

As you recall, in February, out of an abundance of caution, the secretary ordered the temporary repositioning of about 160 members of the Florida National Guard who were then supporting the Joint Multinational Training Group Ukraine, and we said at the time that this decision was not the end of the — our relationship with Ukraine, of course and with that, we would explore new ways to work together in the future. The recent reunion now of these Florida National Guard members with their Ukrainian colleagues, we are told, was an emotional meeting, given the strong bonds that were formed as they were living and working together before temporarily parting ways in — in February.

Now, this new training effort in Germany and at other locations in Europe is in direct support of recent U.S. security assistance packages that are designed to help Ukraine win their battles today and build strength for tomorrow. These new systems and the associated training that will strengthen Ukraine’s ability to counter Russia’s renewed offensive in Eastern Ukraine. Since 2021, the United States has committed more than $4.3 billion in security assistance to support Ukraine’s Armed Forces in the face of Russian aggression, and as I have said before, we should not forget the importance of this long-term training relationship.

Now we’re — yet today, we’re talking about the Florida National Guard, but as you all know better than me, they were preceded by others of their colleagues going back over the last eight years. And so while we are rightly focused on the security assistance that’s going into Ukraine, we shouldn’t forget that a big part of Ukraine’s soldiers’ ability to defend the country as well as they have has been the training that they have gotten over the past eight years that have really sort — sort of helped transform them off of Soviet doctrine and — and Soviet area organization. They are — they have better command and control. They have better battlefield initiative. They have a competent noncommissioned officer corps that is empowered on the field of battle to make tactical decisions. That didn’t happen by accident, and so we’re grateful to be able to at least start some of this training on these key systems that are going forward and — and to keep improving their battlefield competence.

Now, I also have a couple of other schedule items to brief you. The Japanese Defense Minister Kishi will travel to the United States from May 3rd to the 6th, and he’ll have a chance to meet with Secretary Austin on the 4th of May. Items on the agenda, of course, include Ukraine. We were grateful that Japan was represented in that 40-plus meeting, that consultative meeting in Ramstein earlier this week. They’ll talk about China, of course, North Korea and defense cooperation initiatives to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Kishi will also have a chance to visit the Missile Defense Agency and U.S. Cyber Command to exchange views on ballistic missile defense and cyber cooperation.

And then lastly, on Wednesday, the 25th of May, Secretary Austin will travel to Colorado Springs to deliver the commencement address at the Air Force Academy this year. He’s very excited to get this opportunity to speak to the cadets as they begin brand-new careers as officers in the United States Air Force.

And with that, questions. Lita?

Q: … John. Can you flesh out the training decision a little more? Is — this is the same unit that was pulled out largely, other than maybe onesies, twosies that that might have swapped. But this is essentially the same unit that got pulled out of Ukraine?

MR. KIRBY: That’s correct, yeah.

Q: OK.

MR. KIRBY: They — they did not leave Europe. Yeah.

Q: And then are they doing the bulk of the training, or are they being supplemented by other U.S. forces on some of the other training?

MR. KIRBY: My — my — my under…

Q: In multiple locations, or is it consolidated? Can you give us a — a

MR. KIRBY: Sure. My understanding is the bulk of the training on these new systems will be done by the Florida National Guard, but I don’t want to preclude the — the — the option that on — on — on systems coming in that — that we might provide additional training capabilities that maybe the Florida National Guard doesn’t have, so — they’re do the bulk of it, but I’m not going to go so far as to say that all of the training will be done just by the Florida National Guard.

And what I can tell you is that we’re talking about roughly three locations outside of — of Ukraine, and in this case, we — we definitely can identify Germany as a site, but there are other sites outside Ukraine, and — and we’re just not at liberty to disclose where they are. Those sites could change over time. Either — either we move to different ones, or we add additional ones. We just don’t know, but — but training has already occurred outside Ukraine, and particularly on the howitzers. There’s another class going on right now on howitzers. In fact, two different tranches are being trained on howitzers right — right now. One of them, we can confirm, is in — is in Germany.

So we want to make this as nimble and as agile as we can, and we also want to make it not only useful and constructive for the Ukrainians, but not onerous, you know, that it doesn’t — that it’s not so time-consuming that it takes them out of their fight for — for too long, as you might imagine. These — these soldiers are — they’re eager to learn these new skills, but they’re also eager to apply those new skills in the conflict.

Q: And just one clarification: Has that Florida unit then extended, as — as we know some have not been redeployed?

MR. KIRBY: There has been no extension decision made on the — the — the Florida National Guard. As you might recall, Lita, they — they arrived in Ukraine at the very tail end of last year, early December-ish, so they are still on their original set of orders.

Travis?

Q: Hi, John. Happy Friday. I wanted to ask you about the former Marine who was killed in Ukraine, Willy Joseph Cancel. I hope I’m pronouncing his name correctly. But he was reportedly employed by a military contractor. Was that company contracted with the Department of Defense?

MR. KIRBY: Not that I’m aware of.

Q: Does the Department of Defense have any contractors working in Ukraine?

MR. KIRBY: Not that I’m aware of.

Yeah, Jen ?

Q: John, can you enumerate any more of the donations that came out of the conference earlier this week with the 40 nations? Is there anything else concrete that you can point to?

MR. KIRBY: There — there were some additional contributions but those nations have — have decided that it — it — it’s best for — for them to either talk about it or not, and so we want to respect that. I mean, the Secretary, at his press conference, afterward detailed what — what he could.

And again, these are sovereign decisions that we want to be respectful — but the bottom line is yes, there were additional nations who had additional contributions that they stated they — they planned to make. And again, we’re going to leave it to them to speak to them.

Q: And what — what more can you tell us about what’s happening in Moldova? And can you deter Russia from going into Moldova? What would happen if Russia were to actually move into that area?

MR. KIRBY: So look, we’re aware of these explosions that happened in the Transnistria region of Moldova. We do not have much information about what caused those explosions, who was responsible, what the motive was.

And look, the farther away we get from them, the — probably the less fingertip feel we’re going to have, in — in terms of what actually happened. We absolutely respect Moldova’s sovereignty, we want every other nation in the world to respect it. A Russian General out there claiming that Moldova’s next is clearly irresponsible rhetoric.

I — I’m not going to get into hypotheticals about what the Russians will do or won’t do or what the — or — or what the people of Moldova will do. Our focus is on making sure that Ukraine, whose sovereignty actually has been violated by Russia, is able to defend itself against that — that violation and — and — and achieve their own victories on the battlefield. That’s where our — that’s where our heads are right now.

Q: Thank you.

MR. KIRBY: Anybody else? Phil?

Q: You — you talked about training. Is there any consideration being given to returning some training to inside Ukraine, now that diplomats are returning to Ukraine, or is the idea of training inside Ukraine, you know, a non-starter because of the President’s guidance against engaging directly with the Russians?

MR. KIRBY: Right now, Phil, we don’t have any plans to return to training inside Ukraine. The training that we’ll do will be outside of — of Ukraine.

Now, one thing I will say is that we are exploring, on some of these systems, the possibility of doing virtual training, so where the trainers would be obviously outside Ukraine but able to communicate with Ukrainian troops inside Ukraine virtually. So that’s an option available to us. It hasn’t started, we’re — we’re not doing that right now, but we foresee the possibility on some of these systems where maybe checking in every now and then, familiarization, that kind of a virtual connection is certainly a possibility. But there’s no plans right now to put U.S. trainers back on the ground in Ukraine.

Q: And also, on the training in — in — in other parts of Europe, what are the limits of how many Ukrainians who can actually get out of the country and out of the fight to do this training? And how does that affect what systems you — are going to make available?

MR. KIRBY: Yeah, it’s — it’s a great balance that we’re trying to strike, Phil. I mean, just take a look at what we’ve done so far — relatively small numbers. And again, we’re — we’re taking — we’re trying to focus this training on individuals who are — are already familiar with that kind of capability.

So for instance, artillery’s a great example. We’re not bringing out infantrymen and — and — and teaching them how to use our Howitzers, we’re bringing out a small number of artillerymen because the systems are familiar. It won’t be that much of a stretch for them to learn an American howitzer.

Training them up right now, it’s been two tranches of about 50 — and again, the numbers were set by the Ukrainians and in — in — in concert with them. And they are basically going to be trainers themselves. They’ll go back into Ukraine and train their teammates.

On the radar systems, the counter-artillery radar and the towed air defense radar system that we’re giving them, the — we’re — we’re training a small number, less than 20, Ukrainians who, again, already have radar skills, bringing them out for, like, a week.

So we’re — we’re trying to give them systems, new systems — if — if — if we’re going to give them new systems, we’re trying to give them systems that are roughly akin to what they’re used to and won’t require an onerous amount of — of training. And so that’s the focus right now.

I — I won’t get ahead of decisions going forward, but right now, because they’re in such an active fight, we — we don’t want to belabor them with long, complicated training that also requires a high number of personnel, cause they — they are in an active fight right now. And they, too, are suffering casualties on the battlefield and we want to be respectful of that.

Yeah, Lara?

Q: So just on this $33 billion package that the President is sending over, once Congress does approve that, once — if, does any of this have to be spent by the end of the fiscal year? And if so, does that limit cause any issues, particularly for the replenishment of DOD’s …

MR. KIRBY: I think some of that will be determined by Congress in — in the — in what they approve in the supplemental request. As the President said, if we get speedy approval on this, the — this funding will probably get us through five months. So that certainly gets you well within the fiscal year.

What — what we’re planning on is — is being — assuming it gets approved, and as you heard the Secretary say, we urge Congress to approve this in a speedy way, we would expect that — that this would be actionable on — on our part, well within the — the bounds of the fiscal year.

Yeah?

Q: And then just as a follow up, we — are we going to hear more about the capabilities that we would be transferring to Ukraine …

MR. KIRBY: You sure will. Yeah — yeah.

Q: When — when do you understand that this — these capabilities will be delivered?

MR. KIRBY: Well, look, I mean, you’re talking about the supplemental. So first, it has to get approved, but I can tell you that Pentagon planners are already putting pen to paper and — and working with the Ukrainians on what — what they would need, once — once we get approval and sort of where we’re at. We still have some drawdown authorities still available to us, as well, but this would be on top of that. So we’re — already started sticking that through with the — with the Ukrainians.

And as for speed, Lara, again, it would depend on what — what goes into the package, how fast you can get it there, but I would tell you, I mean, just look at what we were able to do with the Howitzers, which was a brand new capability we gave them in just the previous two presidential drawdown packages, within just the last couple of weeks.

And from — in — in some cases — not in every case — but in some cases, from the time the President signed the authorization to the moment Howitzers started showing up in the region was only about 48 hours, and then 24 hours or so after that, actually showing up in — in Ukraine.

And — and so over the last two packages, that’s 90 Howitzers between the two — between PDA-8 — I’m sorry, 7 and 8, and of those 90, more than half of them are in Ukraine as we speak. And those trainers that just finished the — the — the week-long course were able to fall right in on top of equipment that was waiting for them. I mean, that’s — that’s just an incredible rate of effectiveness and efficiency, in terms of getting them there.

It’s a long answer to a very good question. What I would say is, just to wrap it up, whatever goes in these future aid packages, I can assure you that we will work with lightning speed to get them there as — as fast as possible.

Yeah, Ryo.

Q: Thank you. I want to ask you about the Secretary’s meeting with Japanese counterpart Kishi next week. Is the Secretary going to discuss any concrete steps to maintain peace and stability over the Taiwan Strait?

MR. KIRBY: I think, as I read out at the beginning, that they clearly expect China to come up as part of this discussion, Ryo. I’m not going to get ahead of the actual agenda here. We’re just announcing the visit. And we’re very pleased to welcome Minister Kishi here at the Pentagon. We’ll have a full readout, I think, as you know, but clearly, tensions with China will absolutely be on the agenda.

Q: Thank you.

MR. KIRBY: OK. Yeah. In the back there.

Q: Thank you. I just wanted to follow up about Secretary Austin’s meeting with the Japanese Defense Minister. So, like this year’s invasion of the Ukraine, what kind of discussions do you expect? And do you expect there will be some discussions to reassure nuclear deterrence to East Asia during survivorship?

MR. KIRBY: I would say a couple of things. We obviously have a treaty alliance with Japan that we take very, very seriously. And — and that includes a shared discussion over deterrence capabilities. I won’t go into specifics about nuclear deterrence or nuclear posture, but I can assure you that a not-insignificant amount of the discussion with Minister Kishi will be about how we, the United States, continue to meet our security commitments to Japan. And you had another question that I think I did not get?

Q: Nuclear deterrents.

MR. KIRBY: Yeah, I just — I just thought I answered that one. OK. Looks like — am I good? Are you OK?

Q: … Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. What kind of…

MR. KIRBY: Yeah, so, again, I’m not going to get too far ahead of a meeting that hasn’t happened yet. We were delighted that Japan could join us. They joined virtually, but still, they participated in the — in the Consultative Meeting in Ramstein earlier this week; it was terrific that they were able to — to attend. And I suspect that the Secretary wants to pick up on that conversation with — with the minister not unlike he did yesterday with the minister of defense from Canada. There’s a lot, an awful lot to discuss. I won’t speak for Japan, and what they are or are willing to do going forward in terms of supporting Ukraine, that’s their decisions — their decisions to speak to. But they’re a key ally and a great friend, and the Secretary looks forward to talking with them in furtherance of our discussion at Ramstein.

Kelly?

Q: I have two questions, but I’d like to ask you off the top about the Time article where President Zelenskyy says he came within minutes of Russian forces finding him right in the beginning days of the war. I was curious about your thoughts on that and that revelation.

MR. KIRBY: I can’t confirm that anecdote. Certainly, I’m in no position to refute President Zelenskyy’s own accounting of this. But I think it just goes to show you how much energy the Russians were trying to apply to Kyiv, which — which makes it all the more impressive that they lost that battle. The second thing that I take away when I — when I hear about this anecdote is — is the inspirational leadership of President Zelenskyy that — that he never left, he’s still there.

And he never gave up command and control of his forces. He still has terrific command and controls forces. He’s still the democratically elected leader of Ukraine and executing those responsibilities every single day under incredible pressure and clearly under a very real physical threat to — to his life. But he’s still there. And Secretary Austin was honored to be able to travel to Kyiv and meet with him and talk to him, you know, face to face, about the leadership challenges that he continues to face.

Q: I just wanted to follow up on the other day when we were talking about the nuclear threat and taking it seriously. Is there anything we’re doing to show that we’re taking it seriously? Any deterrence? And does the Pentagon worry that Putin might look to use more low-yield tactical nuclear missiles on the battlefield?

MR. KIRBY: Yeah, we’ve talked about this low-yield tactical nuke issue. Look, a nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon. And you can talk all you want about low yield and tactical and all that. It’s a nuclear weapon. It’s a weapon of mass destruction. And it’s completely irresponsible for a nuclear power to be saber-rattling like that and blustering on about the potential use of nuclear weapons of any kind of any — of any size of any yield.

And that’s why we’re monitoring this, as best we can, the Russian nuclear capabilities. And as I’ve said, many, many times, we are comfortable with the strategic nuclear deterrent posture that — that we have in place to defend the homeland and defend our allies and partners. And we urge Russia to stop escalating the rhetoric with respect to nuclear weapons and do the right thing. End the war today. Have your troops leave Ukraine, sit down in good faith with President Zelenskyy and do the right thing.

Barbara?

Q: Two points to follow up on. Most days, you talk about that notion of the Russians and the Ukrainians sitting down and negotiating. I think you have used that word many, many times. I want to make sure I understand what you say — what you mean when you say that; what is it that the Pentagon believes they should negotiate about? And…

MR. KIRBY: Let me — let me — if I could just take that one. We’re not dictating terms of negotiation to Ukraine; we are simply reiterating what President Zelenskyy has said he wants to do.

Q: So, you’re talking about Ukraine — your frame of reference is what Ukraine — when you say negotiating, that’s what…

MR. KIRBY: President Zelenskyy has said he wants to sit down with President Putin and find a way to end this war. We respect and support that. We are not in any way — we are not fashioning negotiation tactics, we’re not suggesting approaches to — President Zelenskyy is the democratically elected president of a sovereign nation, and only he can decide what — what victory is going to look like and how he wants to achieve it. Don’t read anything more into that than that. And your second question?

Q: Yeah, I do. You mentioned several minutes ago about the budget you’re asking for, for the $16 billion. If I understood you right, $16 billion in additional weapons transfers to Ukraine would let — would last about five months.

MR. KIRBY: The President said that this — this would — this would serve for about five months. It’s an approximation.

Q: Sure. So, what I wanted to ask you. Underpinning all of that, what is the planning — even though you cannot say how long the war will last and no one thinks you have a crystal ball on that…

MR. KIRBY: You’re getting ahead of my answer, I see.

Q: I would like to ask you since you have laid out the five months. What is the planning scenario that you’re planning against? Certainly, there is no indication that this is going to end anytime soon. So, what are you — you know, are you thinking more than five months? Is five months the outside? What is the planning scenario for how long this may take?

MR. KIRBY: I want to be — a couple of things. When the president talked about five months, he was talking about the entire 33 billion, not just the 16 billion for security assistance. We’re not putting a time horizon on the — the specific security assistance that we supply Ukraine. We — when we get the authority, we source it, and we get it there. And we’ve been getting it there in record time. And we are talking to the Ukrainians literally every day about their consumption rate, about how fast they’re working their way through some of these. Some systems…some munitions they work through very, very quickly, others not so much. I mean, 50 million rounds of small arms ammunition, and they still tell us that that is probably one of the most critical things that they need, small arms ammunition, because they’re using it literally every day.

So their consumption rates are different and it’s going to change from day to day given on what resistance they’re offering the Russians. So we’re not — we’re not scoping it out by the calendar, Barb. I mean, we are scoping it out by the consumption rate and the needs of the Ukrainians. And that’s why we continue. You’ve seen us now, several packages, the quantities change, the capabilities change given the situation in Ukraine and — and our conversations with them.

Q: So just to be clear, U.S. military assistance goes until there is a peace agreement.

MR. KIRBY: The president has been very clear, Barb, that we’re going to continue to support Ukraine’s ability to defend itself over. We’re going to do it as much as we can and as fast as we can. And that’s the — that’s the focus. We’re not putting a date on the calendar and saying, well, if it doesn’t end by such and such a date, well, that is it, you know, the well has dried up, we’re not going to support you. The president has been clear.

Q: But let me try one more time. The reality would be at this point in years, not months.

MR. KIRBY: I don’t think anybody can know that, Barbara. I mean, I don’t know how anybody can know that. The war — and I know you get — I say this all the time and — and you probably are tired of me saying it, but it’s true, it could end tomorrow. It could end tomorrow if Mr. Putin did the right thing. Now clearly he has shown no desire to do that. We understand that. So in the meantime, whatever that meantime is, weeks, months, whatever that meantime is, we are going to continue to provide the capabilities that Ukraine needs to defend itself.

Let’s see. I need my glasses. Oh, Sylvie.

Q: Hello, John. Thank you. I have a question about Secretary Austin said that the U.S. wants to see the Russian military power degraded for the long term. So how can this happen? And what is the US doing to make it happen?

MR. KIRBY: Sylvie, what he said was we wanted to see a weakened Russia.

MR. KIRBY: That’s what he said. And he had an opportunity to talk about it again in Ramstein. I can’t really say it any better than he did. I would certainly refer you back to the transcript of that press conference. But in a nutshell, his point was, and this has always been, from the outset of this war, it has been administration policy to — to not allow Russia to be in a position to do this again. That is what he was talking about. And they are already a weaker military. They have suffered thousands of casualties. They have lost airplanes. They have lost tanks. They have certainly lost battles. And — and they are certainly a weaker military than they were 64 days ago, no question about it.

We don’t want to see them be able to restore that kind of aggressive power again and — and do this kind of thing to another neighbor. And the bottom line is, and, again, we’ve been saying this from the very beginning, that this should not be cost-free for Mr. Putin. He should suffer consequences. And, quite frankly, he has, not only on the battlefield but as an economy. And his — and the export controls, the sanctions that are in place, they have already affected his ability to — to regenerate some of his military capability.

We talked about precision-guided munitions the other day, it’s a great example. He’s struggling now to get components for some of those munitions. And we’re already starting to seek in Mariupol, which they continue to bomb, an increasing reliance on non-precision-guided munitions. So that is all accounting for a weaker Russia. I think we can all agree that — that we don’t want, or at least we all should agree that we don’t want Mr. Putin to be in the same position going forward that he found himself in in late February when he was able to launch this unprovoked invasion.

Q: If I can follow up?

MR. KIRBY: … from Al-Monitor.

Q: Sylvie, do you want to go ahead? I think Sylvie had a further follow-up.

Q: Thank you. Thank you, Jared.

Yes, I had a follow-up. Is the fear of Putin using a nuclear weapon overblown?

MR. KIRBY: Blown?

Q: Overblown.

MR. KIRBY: You have a nation the size of Russia with a nuclear arsenal their size and capability and a leader that is clearly as belligerent as Vladimir Putin, we have to take seriously the escalatory rhetoric that he and his leaders have been using lately. It would be — as irresponsible as it is for him to use that rhetoric, it would be equally irresponsible for us not to take it seriously. And so we do. And we monitor the capabilities as best we can. And if we have to make changes, we will. As I said, we have seen no reason to change our nuclear strategic deterrent posture at this time.

Q: Thank you.

MR. KIRBY: Let’s see, Jared, yes, over to you.

Q: Hi, John, thanks. Just a question about the Ramstein meeting. There were a handful of Middle Eastern allies invited. I think Qatar, Jordan, Israel, Morocco, and Tunisia. Just wondering the specific reason for inviting these allies. You know, what is the department hoping they can contribute? And why were some other major U.S. partners from that region left off the list? Thanks.

MR. KIRBY: There was — it wasn’t that — you know, it’s not about leaving folks off. There were a lot of invites. We gave you a list of those who — who accepted. And we’ll let those nations who may have been invited and didn’t accept, they can speak for themselves. The list we put out was a list of the countries that accepted the — our invitation. And we were grateful for their participation.

I think there is two things here. One, the broad invite list was a statement of the mere fact that this has the attention of the international community, not just NATO, and not just nations in the European theater who are not in NATO. It has the attention of the entire world and that was represented clearly, if you looked at those 40 countries from, as you said, the Middle East, Jared, all the way to the Indo-Pacific. So it’s a representation of the — of the interest and the concern of so many nations. It’s also a representation of the fact that we recognize some of these nations have had expressed in various forms an interest to help. And some of that help will be in terms of capabilities that they have, systems that they have that the Ukrainians might be able to benefit from. It could just be financial contributions.

But — but every nation that was there, the secretary said it best, you wouldn’t come to a meeting like that if you didn’t care about Ukraine. And that’s really what was driving the list of attendees. Each nation, I think, should speak for themselves about what drove them to attend that meeting. And so many — the majority, as you saw, were actually in person. They traveled a long way to be — to be with us in Germany. And each nation, I think, should speak for what drove them to do that. But the bottom line is they were there. And they were there because they cared. They were there because they’re concerned about Mr. Putin and his war of choice. And they were there because they had a genuine interest in exploring ways they could contribute.

OK. I’ll take a couple more. It’s a Friday. Go ahead.

Q: A question for you on Mr. Putin himself. Is it still the Pentagon’s assessment that he’s being deceived by his advisers? And also have you seen any signs of growing dissension in either important government ranks in Russia or from Russian elites to his actions in Ukraine?

MR. KIRBY: It’s not entirely clear how truthful the information is that Mr. Putin is — is getting. We — we — we did have some indications earlier that — that he wasn’t necessarily getting an accurate picture. I — I — I can’t update you on that. I don’t know what his briefings are like and who’s briefing him, and what information he’s getting.

Clearly, he — he — he messages, and he — I can’t speak for what’s in his head, but he — he’s — he’s messaging that — that — that he is — is going to — to achieve military outcomes in the Donbas in the — in the south, specifically, the — the — the Donbas, and he’s got some bizarre messaging about Nazis in Ukraine, and he’s got even more bizarre messaging about how this is the United States versus Russia or the West versus Russia. It’s not. Russia’s the aggressor. They’re the ones that started this war in Ukraine. But how much information he gets that’s informing some of these ridiculous claims, I — I can’t say.

And I’m sorry, you had another question, didn’t you?

Q: Just basically any dissent from…

MR. KIRBY: Oh.

Q: … important government…

MR. KIRBY: Nothing that we can speak to or that we’ve — we’ve seen. What we have seen are continued indications at lower levels in the army of — of — of poor morale, discouragement, lack of unit cohesion. I mean, this is an army that writ large, across the entire Russian army, is about 40 percent conscripts, and they — they’ve just now put a bunch more fresh conscripts into the fight. And what we’re seeing is, you know, they — they tend to have high morale going in; first contact with the enemy, that morale is shattered. And so we continue to see problems at — at the unit level anecdotally. I can’t say every single unit, but anecdotally, some — some unit cohesion issues that they still haven’t — they still haven’t been able to solve. But at the senior level, I — I just don’t have any information to speak to that.

Phil?

Q: Putting aside whether you agree with his logic, do you believe that Putin is a rational actor?

MR. KIRBY: I — I’m not a psychologist; barely got a history degree from University of South Florida. I’m not going to go into the psychology of Vladimir Putin. It’s hard to look at what he’s doing in Ukraine, what his forces are doing in Ukraine and think that any ethical, moral individual could justify that. It’s difficult to look at the — sorry. It’s difficult to look at some of the images and imagine that any well-thinking, serious, mature leader would do that. So I can’t talk to his psychology, but I think we can all speak to his depravity.

Barbara?

Q: I want to follow up on that exactly. You’ve just used a series of words that I don’t think we have heard you specifically use before: depravity, ridiculous, bizarre, belligerent. You may not be a psychiatrist, but what are you telling the world right now, today, by standing up here and saying these things? What is the sense in this government of Putin? You have just — and you’ve been in the military a long time. You’ve seen a lot. You don’t usually publicly react to all the — to these very difficult images. You’ve used extraordinary words here today, starting with depravity. What does this government think Vladimir Putin’s mental state is, physical state, psychological state? What do you — what — something’s leading you today to use this series — these series of words.

MR. KIRBY: I — I — I can’t speak for the entire U.S. government. I speak for the Defense Department, and I didn’t mean to get emotional. I apologize for that. I don’t want to make this about me. But I’ve been around the military a long, long time, and I — I’ve known friends who didn’t make it back. It’s just hard. It — it’s hard for all of you, particularly you. You — you all have people there who are seeing this and bringing these images back. It’s just difficult to — to look at that, and it’s hard to — it — it’s hard to square his — let’s just call it what it is, his B.S. that this is about Nazi-ism in Ukraine, and it’s about protecting Russians in Ukraine, and it’s about defending Russian national interests, when none of them — none of them were threatened by Ukraine. It’s hard to square that rhetoric by what he’s actually doing inside Ukraine to innocent people shot in the back of the head, hands tied behind their backs, women, you know, pregnant women being killed, hospitals being bombed. I mean, it’s just unconscionable, and I don’t know — I — I — I don’t have the — I don’t have the mental capacity to understand how you get — how you connect those two things. It’s just beyond me.

But I’m just a spokesman, Barb. I’m not qualified to make an assessment one way or the other, and I do apologize for…

Q: No, I don’t (inaudible)…

MR. KIRBY: … injecting my personal perspective here.

Q: … anticipate. You are very professional on this podium, and nothing else. But can you tell us, can you just peel one layer back, if possible? The U.S. government military intelligence always has assessments on foreign leaders. This is a known fact. Is there anything you can tell us that you might be able to share to help people understand, what is Putin’s state of mind? And what…

MR. KIRBY: I think — look, again, not a psychological expert. I’m not going to get into individual intelligence assessments. I — I think — I think we — we’re certainly working under an assumption that Mr. Putin was capable of pursuing what he believe Russia’s national interest to be with — with — with cold steel and with — with — with brutal determination. I — I think we all understood that.

I — I don’t think we fully appreciated the degree to which he would visit that kind of violence and cruelty and as I said, depravity on innocent people, on — on noncombatants, on — on civilians with — with such — with — with such utter disregard for the lives he was taking, the lives he — he was flinging into the refuge. I mean, there’s not even — there’s not even an attempt by Russia to — to be precise, in their targeting.

Even if — even if you could find your way to getting to rationalize what he’s doing, which is, of course, unacceptable, but let’s just say hypothetically, you, you could get yourself to a point where you believed this war was justified. You can’t look at the way he’s prosecuting it. And his forces are prosecuting it. And — and come to a conclusion that — that he’s doing it in a justified manner. It’s — it’s just — it’s brutality of the — of the coldest and — and — and most depraved sort. And I don’t know that I could do it any better than that.

Q: (off-mic)

Barb, I’m — that’s — I’m not — I’m not qualified at this podium to talk about those kinds of things. I think you know, we, as an administration, we have made clear, you know, that this war is not about regime change. This is — this is about helping Ukraine defend itself.

Jen?

Q: John, are we witnessing a genocide?

MR. KIRBY: That is not a decision that the Department of Defense would make, Jen, that there’s a — there’s a process for determining that, a legal process for determining that, and that’s — that’s beyond this podium to speak to. But clearly, we have said and — and I’m certainly willing to repeat it, that it’s very clear that Russian forces have committed war crimes. There’s no question about that.

OK, on that note, I think I’m going to call it a day. Thank you very much. Have a good weekend, and we’ll see you back here on Monday. Thanks.

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U.S. Troops Train Ukrainians in Germany

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U.S. Troops Train Ukrainians in Germany
April 29, 2022 | By JIM GARAMONE
U.S. service members in Germany have begun training Ukrainian soldiers on key systems being used to defend Ukraine against the Russian invasion, Pentagon Press Secretary John F. Kirby said today.

“These efforts build on the initial artillery training that Ukraine’s forces already have received elsewhere and also includes training on radar systems and armored vehicles that have been recently announced as part of security assistance packages,” Kirby said.

U.S. Army Europe and Africa is organizing the training in coordination with Germany.

Florida National Guardsmen — who were part of the Joint Multinational Training Group in Western Ukraine and were ordered out of the country as the threat of the Russian invasion intensified — have reunited with Ukrainians in Germany and are again working to give the Ukrainians the knowledge they need to defend their country.

“The recent reunion of these Florida National Guard members with their Ukrainian colleagues, we are told, was an emotional meeting, given the strong bonds that were formed as they were living and working together before temporarily parting ways in February,” Kirby said.

The United States is not the only country training Ukrainian service members. Yesterday, Canadian Defense Minister Anita Anand said Canadian service members were training Ukrainians on the M-777 howitzer in Europe.

This training effort is in direct support of recent U.S. security assistance packages “designed to help Ukraine win their battles today and build strength for tomorrow,” Kirby said.

These systems are necessary to counter Russia’s new push into the Donbas region of Ukraine.

This training package is just the latest in an effort that goes back to the break-up of the Soviet Union, but that intensified after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014 and illegally annexed Crimea. “We’re here today talking about the Florida National Guard,” he said. “But as you all know, they were preceded by others of their colleagues going back over the last eight years.”

That training effort has been key to Ukraine’s stout defense of its capital city of Kyiv and the fight they are putting up in Donbas. The training helped transform Ukraine from a Soviet-style military to a more agile and deadly force. “They have better command and control,” Kirby said. “They have better battlefield initiative. They have a competent noncommissioned officer corps that is empowered on the field of battle to make tactical decisions. That didn’t happen by accident.”

The bulk of the training on the new systems Ukraine is getting will be performed by the Florida Guardsmen. They can, of course, call on Army units in Germany to assist if they need it, the press secretary said.

U.S. officials want to make the training useful and constructive, but not onerous — meaning the Ukrainians are fighting a war in their country and do not have the time for long training classes. As such, the Ukraine military chose artillery personnel to learn to operate the M-777 howitzer. They have the background needed to operate artillery and just need to learn the peculiarities of the American system.

The same is true of radar operators. While they will receive American systems, these soldiers have already learned about radar and just need to learn what buttons to push, or what pulses mean on American sets.

These Ukrainians soldiers will then go back to Ukraine and teach their fellow soldiers how to use the equipment effectively.

“As you might imagine, these soldiers are eager to learn these new skills, but they’re also eager to apply those new skills in the conflict,” Kirby said.

The press secretary was asked about Russian nuclear saber-rattling. He said the United States continually watches the Russia’s nuclear preparations, and officials believe U.S. deterrence is positioned correctly. He said the United States takes any threats seriously and is prepared.

“I’m not going to go into the psychology of Vladimir Putin,” Kirby said. “It’s hard to look at what he’s doing in Ukraine, what his forces are doing in Ukraine and think that any ethical, moral individual could justify that. It’s difficult to look at some of the images and imagine that any well-thinking, serious, mature leader would do that. So, I can’t talk to his psychology. But I think we can all speak to his depravity.”

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Today in DOD: May 2, 2022

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Today in DOD: April 30, 2022

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Contracts For April 29, 2022

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Contracts For April 29, 2022
ARMY

Business Enabled Acquisition & Technology-Abacus Technology Corporation LLC,* San Antonio, Texas (W91RUS-22-D-0002, P00000); A&T Systems Inc.,* Silver Spring, Maryland (W91RUS-22-D-0003, P00000); Advanced IT Concepts Inc.,* Winter Springs, Florida (W91RUS-22-D-0004, P00000); Full Spectrum LLC,* Fairfax Station, Virginia (W91RUS-22-D-0005, P00000); Futron Inc.,* Woodbridge, Virginia (W91RUS-22-D-0006, P00000); GC&E Federal LLC,* Peachtree Corners, Georgia (W91RUS-22-D-0007, P00000); Global Management Systems Inc.,* Rockville, Maryland (W91RUS-22-D-0008, P00000); Gstek Inc.,* Chesapeake, Virginia (W91RUS-22-D-0009, P00000); Information Systems Solutions Inc.,* Rockville, Maryland (W91RUS-22-D-0010, P00000); Leader Communications Inc., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (W91RUS-22-D-0011, P00000); Link Solutions Inc., McLean,* Virginia (W91RUS-22-D-0012, P00000); MilVets System Technology Inc.,* Orlando, Florida (W91RUS-22-D-0013, P00000); Oneida Technical Solutions LLC,* Oneida, New York (W91RUS-22-D-0014, P00000); People, Technology & Processes LLC,* Tampa, Florida (W91RUS-22-D-0015, P00000); Vision Information Technology Consultants LLC,* San Antonio, Texas (W91RUS-22-D-0016, P00000); and Chartis Consulting Corporation, Mclean, Virginia (W91RUS-22-D-0017, P00000), will compete for each order of the $990,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for services that will include activities in support of all aspects of information and communication systems for the Army Network Enterprise Technology Command. Bids were solicited via the internet with 31 received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 28, 2027. Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

The Lane Construction Corporation, Cheshire, Connecticut, was awarded a $357,983,153 firm-fixed-price contract for stormwater management systems, electrical distribution, telecommunications, water distribution and pump station, sanitary sewer and sewer lift stations, natural gas, landscaping, and transportation improvements. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, with an estimated completion date of June 25, 2025. Fiscal 2019 and 2020 military construction, Air Force funds in the amount of $357,983,153 were obligated at the time of the award. Army Corps of Engineers, Mobile, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W91278-22-C-0017).

Lockheed Martin Corporation, Grand Prairie, Texas, was awarded a $223,989,404 modification (P00033) to contract W31P4Q-19-C-0077 for the recapitalization of the Multiple Launch Rocket System into the M270A2 configuration. Work will be performed in Camden, Arizona; Grand Prairie, Texas; and New Boston, Texas, with an estimated completion date of April 30, 2026. Fiscal 2022 missile procurement, Army and Foreign Military Sales (United Kingdom) funds in the amount of $223,989,404 were obligated at the time of the award. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

Lockheed Martin Corporation, Grand Prairie, Texas, was awarded a $204,725,645 fixed-price-incentive contract for production of High Mobility Artillery Rock Systems M142 launchers and support requirements. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work will be performed in Dallas, Texas; Archbald, Pennsylvania; Camden, Arkansas; York, Pennsylvania; Palm Bay, Florida; Brownsboro, Alabama; Boca Raton, Florida; Whippany, New Jersey; Jackson, Mississippi; and Clearwater, Florida, with an estimated completion date of April 29, 2025. Fiscal 2022 missile procurement, Army funds and Department of Defense Public Enterprise funds in the amount of $81,303,650 were obligated at the time of the award. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity (W31P4Q-22-C-0047).

Melwood Horticultural Center, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, was awarded a $113,798,134 firm-fixed-price contract for base operations and maintenance support services at Fort Meade, Maryland. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 30, 2027. Army Field Directorate Office, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is the contracting activity (W9124J-22-D-0013).

Accenture Federal Services, Arlington, Virginia, was awarded a $64,702,289 modification (P00013) to contract W52P1J-20-C-0005 to exercise Option Period 1 for the Unified Enterprise Resource Planning Capability Support Services contract. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 30, 2023. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity.

Olin Winchester LLC, Oxford, Mississippi, was awarded a $51,828,706 modification (P00010) to contract W52P1J-21-C-0016 to manufacture 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm and .50 caliber ammunition. Work will be performed in Oxford, Mississippi, with an estimated completion date of Sept. 29, 2023. Fiscal 2021 and 2022 procurement of ammunition, Army funds in the amount of $51,828,706 were obligated at the time of the award. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity.

EMC Inc.,* Grenada, Mississippi (W912HY-22-D-0001); TerraSond Limited, Palmer, Alaska (W912HY-22-D-0002); eTRAC Inc., San Rafael, California (W912HY-22-D-0003); McKim & Creed Inc., Raleigh, North Carolina (W912HY-22-D-0004); and T. Baker Smith LLC, Houma, Louisiana (W912HY-22-D-0005), will compete for each order of the $13,000,000 firm-fixed-price contract for architect and engineering hydrographic surveying and mapping services. Bids were solicited via the internet with seven received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 28, 2027. Army Corps of Engineers, Galveston, Texas, is the contracting activity.

Carahsoft Technology Corp., Reston, Virginia, was awarded a $9,073,528 firm-fixed-price contract to integrate the ServiceNow platform and related IT and non-IT related service desk modules for U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. Bids were solicited via the internet with one received. Work locations and funding will be determined with each order, with an estimated completion date of April 27, 2027. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan is the contracting activity. (W50NH9-22-F-0049).

General Dynamics Land Systems Inc., Sterling Heights, Michigan, was awarded a $7,544,309 modification (P00005) to contract W56HZV-22-C-0012 for Abrams Systems Technical Support. Work will be performed in Sterling Heights, Michigan, with an estimated completion date of June 30, 2023. Fiscal 2020 and 2022 other procurements, Army funds in the amount of $7,544,309 were obligated at the time of the award. Army Contracting Command, Detroit Arsenal, Michigan is the contracting activity.

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

Lockheed Martin Corp. Missiles and Fire Control, Dallas, Texas, is being awarded a $304,909,664 modification (P00051) to a previously-awarded (HQ0147-17-C-0032) contract to exercise an option. The total value of this contract is increased from $7,834,700,609 to $8,139,604,003. Under this modification, the contractor will produce and deliver Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Interceptors and associated one-shot devices to support U.S. government requirements. The work will be performed in Dallas, Texas; Sunnyvale, California; Huntsville, Alabama; Camden, Arkansas; and Troy, Alabama, with an expected completion date of Dec. 1, 2027. Fiscal 2022 procurement funds in the amount of $304,909,664 are being obligated at time of award. The Missile Defense Agency, Huntsville, Alabama, is the contracting activity.

NAVY

Bell Boeing Joint Project Office, Amarillo, Texas, is awarded a $302,152,612 modification (P00053) to a previously awarded fixed-price incentive (firm target), cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N0001917C0015) for the production and delivery of four MV-22B variation in quantity aircraft for the Marine Corps. Work will be performed in Fort Worth, Texas (30.08%); Ridley Park, Pennsylvania (15.22%); Amarillo, Texas (12.73%); Red Oak, Texas (3.33%); East Aurora, New York (2.55%); Park City, Utah (2.20%); McKinney, Texas (1.33%); Endicott, New York (1.15%); various locations within the continental U.S. (27.49%); and various locations outside the continental U.S. (3.92%), and is expected to be completed in November 2025. Fiscal 2022 aircraft procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $302,152,612 will be obligated at the time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

Raytheon Missile and Defense, Tucson, Arizona, is awarded a $102,188,787 firm-fixed-price contract for fiscal 2022 Navy and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) procurements for Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 2/2A Guided Missile Round Pack (GMRP), spare replacement components and recertification. This contract combines purchases for the Navy (75%); the government of Egypt (17%); the government of Japan (4%); the government of United Arab Emirates (UAE) (3%); and the government of Turkey (1%). Work will be performed in Tucson, Arizona (48%); Ottobrunn, Germany (33%); Keyser, West Virginia (8%); Glenrothes Fife, Scotland (3%); Midland, Canada (1%); Joplin, Missouri (1%); Cincinnati, Ohio (1%); Camarillo, California (1%); Williamsport, Pennsylvania (1%); Dallas, Texas (1%); and various other locations each under 1% (2%), and is expected to be completed by March 2025. Fiscal 2022 weapons procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $75,471,023 (74%); FMS (Egypt) funds in the amount of $17,200,660 (17%); FMS (Japan) funds in the amount of $4,865,784 (4%); FMS (UAE) funds in the amount of $3,114,342 (3%); fiscal 2022 operations and maintenance (Navy) funds in the amount of $1,074,978 (1%); and FMS (Turkey) funds in the amount of $462,000 (1%) will be obligated at the time of award, of which $1,074,978 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with 10 U.S. Code 2304(c) (4), International Agreement. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00024-22-C-5400).

Lockheed Martin Corp., Fort Worth, Texas, is awarded a $31,508,022 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. This contract provides maintenance and sustainment operations of the Australia, Canada and United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory facilities and systems, to include consumables and field service representative support. Additionally, this contract provides surrogate encryptions support for the Norway Italy Reprogramming Lab. These efforts are in support of the F-35 Lightning II programs non-U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) participants. Work will be performed in Eglin, Florida (80%); and Fort Worth, Texas (20%), and is expected to be completed in April 2027. Non-U.S. DOD participants funds in the amount of $31,405,066 will be obligated at the time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract was not competitively procured pursuant to 10 U.S. Code 2304(c)(1). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity (N0001922C0046).

The Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., Baltimore, Maryland, is awarded an $18,125,732 firm-fixed-price modification to previously awarded task order N4008520F6537 placed against contract N40085-20-D-0036. This modification provides for the construction of a fourth floor addition and west elevator to the Waterfront Support Facility, Building 178, at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Award of this modification brings the total cumulative contract value to $87,000,389. Work will be performed in Kittery, Maine, and is expected to be completed by June 2024. Fiscal 2022 operation and maintenance, (Navy) funds in the amount of $18,125,732 will be obligated at time of award and will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command Atlantic, Officer in Charge of Construction Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, is the contracting activity.

Ocean Ships Inc., Houston, Texas, is awarded a $8,695,672 option (P00061) for the fixed price portion of a previously awarded contract (N3220519C3003) to fund the operation and maintenance of two expeditionary transfer dock vessels USNS Montford Point (T-ESD 1) and USNS John Glenn (T-ESD 2). This award exercises the third of four, one-year option periods of this contract. The vessels will continue to support Military Sealift Command worldwide prepositioning requirements. Work will be performed at sea worldwide and is expected to be completed, if all options are exercised, by May 1, 2024. Working capital funds (Navy) in the amount of $3,621,212 are obligated for fiscal 2022. Working capital funds (Navy) in the amount of $5,074,461 will be obligated for fiscal 2023, before Sept. 30, 2022. The Navy’s Military Sealift Command, Norfolk, Virginia, is the contracting activity (N3220519C3003).

AIR FORCE

The Boeing Co., Layton, Utah, has been awarded a $20,951,344 undefinitized contract action for the Flight Test Telemetry Termination (FT3) production requirements contract. The objective of this proposed effort is to produce and deliver FT3 Systems that will provide telemetry data, command destruct capabilities and GPS as well as replace/update obsolete and unsupportable flight test unique equipment to support the operational test launch schedule for the Minuteman III. In order to meet the requirement timeline, an undefinitized contract action was necessary to begin acquiring material, and start the lot screening and qualification testing required. Work will be performed in Layton, Utah, and is expected to be completed by April 30, 2030. Fiscal 2022 3020 funds in the amount of $10,475,672 will be obligated at the time of award. Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, Hill Air Force Base, Utah, is the contracting activity (FA8214-22-D-0001).

Akima Support Operations LLC,* Herndon, Virginia, has been awarded a $15,842,383 contract for non‐personal services for continued operational support and civil engineering services on MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Work is expected to be completed by April 30, 2023. Fiscal 2022 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $15,842,383 are being obligated at the time of award. The 6th Contracting Squadron, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity (FA4814‐ 17‐C‐0002). (Awarded April 28, 2022)

Peraton Inc., Herndon, Virginia, has been awarded a $15,037,107 contract for radio detection and ranging (RADAR) support for the Battlespace Command and Control Center-Theater, surveillance and tracking RADAR processors and associated equipment dispersed throughout U.S. Central Command. Work will be performed in Suffolk, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by May 31, 2027. This contract was a competitive acquisition and one offer was received. Fiscal 2022 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $2,345,358 will be obligated at award. Acquisition Management and Integration Center, Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, is the contracting activity (FA4890-22-C-0014).

Centauri LLC, Chantilly, Virginia, has been awarded a $7,943,626 cost-plus-fixed-fee completion type contract for broadening the impact of High-Performance Computing (HPC) by providing improved, secure access to HPC-backed resources and productivity tools. Work will be performed in Maui, Hawaii, and is expected to be completed by May 4, 2026. This award is the result of a competitive acquisition and 11 offers were received. Fiscal 2022 research and development funds in the amount of $416,010 are being obligated at the time of award. Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico, is the contracting activity (FA9451-22-C-0014).

Lockheed Martin Corp., Fort Worth, Texas, has been awarded a $7,705,488 fixed-price incentive-firm modification (P00023) to previously awarded contract FA8615-18-C-6058 for F-16 production. The modification provides for the procurement of Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System II Group B hardware for 16 aircraft and installation for two flight test aircraft. Additionally, the modification provides for integration of the FMU-139D/B fuze; integration of six 600-gallon fuel tanks and non-jettison fuel pylons; and support equipment for conformal fuel tanks and installation. Work will be performed in Greenville, South Carolina; and Fort Worth, Texas, and is expected to be completed by Nov. 29, 2024. This modification involves Foreign Military Sales to the Kingdom of Bahrain. The total cumulative face value of the contract is $1,092,054,633. Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, is the contracting activity.

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Avfuel Corp., Ann Arbor, Michigan, has been awarded a minimum $12,287,219 fixed-price with economic-price-adjustment contract for fuel support at Salina Regional Airport, Kansas. This is a two-year four-month base contract with one six-month option period. Location of performance is Kansas, with a Sept. 30, 2024, performance completion date. Using customers are Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and federal civilian agencies. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2022 through 2024 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Energy, Fort Belvoir, Virginia (SPE607-22-D-0058).

Peckham Vocational Industries Inc.,** Lansing, Michigan, has been awarded a maximum $11,375,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for military uniform cold weather undergarments. This is a one-year base contract with four one-year option periods. Location of performance is Michigan, with an April 28, 2023, ordering period end date. Using military services are Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2022 through 2023 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE1C1-22-D-N162).

Burlington Apparel Fabrics, Greensboro, North Carolina, has been awarded a maximum $10,742,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity letter contract for poly/wool cloth. This was a sole-source acquisition using justification 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c)(1), as stated in Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1. This is a one-year contract with no option periods. Location of performance is North Carolina, with an April 28, 2023, ordering period end date. Using military service is Army. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2022 through 2023 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE1C1-22-D-1545).

UPDATE: Aldevra LLC, Kalamazoo, Michigan (SPE2DH-22-D-0013, $16,280,000), has been added as an awardee to the multiple award contract for medical equipment and accessories for the Defense Logistics Agency Electronic Catalog, issued against solicitation SPE2DH-21-R0002 and awarded Feb. 10, 2022.

*Small business
**Mandatory source

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Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing

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Senior Defense Official Holds a Background Briefing
April 29, 2022
SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Okay, good morning, everybody. Thanks for hanging in with me and happy Friday to you all.

We’ll — we’ll go through some operational stuff first — not a whole lot of changes — and then I’ll — I’ll shift from that to — to the security assistance and — and the training piece. Again, not a whole lot of updates from yesterday, and then we’ll get to your questions.

So here we are on day 64. We’ve observed more than 1,950, now, missile launches. I would tell you that the — the — the preponderance of strikes still are in the JFO and Mariupol, and I would add that in Mariupol, what we’re seeing, a predominance of the ordinance being dropped is dumb ordinance, not precision-guided, and — and we think that that speaks to challenges that the Russians are having with PGM replenishment.

We have also observed, as you guys have all seen, you know, some increasing strike activities in central Ukraine, including Kyiv, as — as well as Western Ukraine, including Odesa and the Odesa area. Again, I — I want to be careful here. We — we don’t have perfect visibility into Russian targeting and — and the Russian mindset as to everything they’re doing. But in general, what we think they’re trying to do is get at the ability of the Ukrainians to — to replenish their own stores and to reinforce themselves.

So for instance, we’re seeing at — at least attempted attacks on — on electrical power facilities, perhaps because the Russians believe if they can knock out some electricity, they can affect the ability of trains, for instance, to move. So it — it’s — it’s not a perfect picture. For instance, in Kyiv, some of the strikes in Kyiv we believe were meant for — for military production capabilities. Now, I know that there’s reports that they hit residential areas. We have no reason to doubt that they did, but we don’t believe at 100 percent certain that they meant to hit residential areas. In other words, they could have been misses.

The — the strikes around Odesa are a little bit more difficult to discern exactly what they’re doing there. We still don’t see any — any amphibious move on Odesa, or any ground move on Odesa. Again, it could be of a piece — could be of a piece of their efforts to try to pin down Ukrainian forces in the area between Odesa and Mykolaiv so that they can’t come to the assistance of their colleagues further in the east in the Donbas area. We — we’re not 100 percent sure. I don’t want to own their thought process; I’m just trying to give you what we — what we kind of think.

Now, in the Donbas area, again, still fighting over in — in various different locations. We believe that essentially what they’re doing is — is continuing to set conditions for a sustained and larger and longer offensive; that I am not suggesting that offensive hasn’t begun. Of course, they’ve begun. There is fighting there. But we still think that it is of a piece of their trying to set the proper conditions for — for sustained offensive operations.

They have made some — the Russians now have made some incremental, uneven and slow advances to the southeast and southwest of Izyum. They appear to be advancing toward towards Sloviansk and a place called Barvinkoe. They continue to use — and this is, again, we’ve talked about this before, given what we expected them to do in the Donbas and — and the importance of long-range fires, but what we see them doing is using artillery and some airstrikes in advance of their ground movements. And so their ground movements are fairly plodding because A, the artillery and airstrikes that they are launching against Ukrainian positions are not having the effect that they want them to have. The Ukrainians are still able to resist a number — and — and B, they’re still a little wary of getting out ahead of their supply lines. They don’t want to make the same mistakes that they’ve made in Kyiv, and so we think they’re — they’re making this sort of plodding, uneven progress, but it is very doctrinal in its approach: launch airstrikes, artillery strikes in advance of — of ground movements, and then only — only then, when you think you’ve softened up the Ukrainian lines do you start to move your ground units. But they’re running straight into stiff Ukrainian resistance. So that’s why we think this progress has been slow and uneven still over the last 24 hours.

We also assess that because of this slow and uneven progress, again, without perfect knowledge of every aspect of the Russian plan, we do believe and assess that they are behind schedule in what they were trying to accomplish in the Donbas. We still believe that — that they want to — that — that they want to press the Ukrainians from three — from three directions: from the east, where they already have Russian forces in the — the — the eastern part of the Donbas region and have had for eight years; from the north, we just talked about that coming out of Izyum; and then from the south coming out of Mariupol. I do not have today a — a number of how many troops have left Mariupol and are moving north. I — I know I’m going to get asked that question. I’m trying to get ahead of you here. I don’t have that number, but we still assess that they are moving forces, trying to move north out of Mariupol and so that they can approach the Ukrainian Armed Forces from that southerly direction. But again, we would assess that their progress in doing so has been slow and uneven, and certainly not decisive in any — in any event.

Today, we believe that they — they still have 92 operational BTGs in Ukraine, but that doesn’t mean, as I said yesterday, that these are all — BTGs are full-up rounds. Yes, they’re operational. They’re capable of — of conducting combat operations, but as I said yesterday, we believe they have suffered attrition. They have suffered losses. Not all these BTGs are — are at 100 percent capability, and we also assess that part of this is not — is — is obviously, the — the fighting that’s going on, but also because, you know, they — they were fairly rushed in reinforcing some of these units into the east. You know, we — we talked a couple of weeks ago about how they are moving troops out of Kyiv and Chernihiv and — and they were to move them to the east to Velykyi and to Belgorod and refit them and resupply them. And that happened, but it happened at a fairly clipped — a fairly-fast clip, and — and so we don’t assess that every BTG that was put back in was put back in even at full strength. So just something to — to note.

They, again, they’re trying to overcome, you know, some of those challenges they had. We’ve said that before, but it is absolutely not clear that they have solved all their problems, and so we would not assess that — that they — that they — that they have everything in place that they need to be fully-successful. That’s it. Of course, they have a numeric advantage and they are concentrating more force in a smaller geographic area, so we have to take that into account. And again, the Ukrainians are putting up a strong resistance throughout the — throughout the area.

There’s absolutely nothing to update in the maritime environment. I’m not even going to go through all the details with you, cause there’s really nothing changed from yesterday. So I’m not going to waste your time with that.

And on security assistance, still a — still a little bit more than 60 percent now of the howitzers have transferred to — into Ukrainian military hands. That’s not a change from yesterday, it’s about 60 percent, but there’s been no numeric changes from yesterday.

Let’s see. Got about — you know, the — the — the 155 artillery rounds continue to — to flow into Ukraine, even over the last 24 hours, and more and more are getting into the region for further shipment into Ukraine, but that — that — they are arriving in there.

In the next 24 hours, more than a dozen flights are expected from the continental United States and — and that will include howitzers, more 155 rounds, some of those Phoenix Ghost UAVs, and — and even some of the radars that we talked about. So the — that’s on PDA-8, and like I said, more than a dozen flights expected in the next 24 hours.

In — let’s see — see if I can find anything else interesting in here. I would say in the last 24 hour, there have been almost 20 deliveries via airlift from seven different nations that have been received in the region at multiple locations, with — with everything from mines to — to small caliber rounds and rockets, 122 millimeter rockets, helmets, body armor, 155 — I’m sorry, that’s from the United States — but so lots of things coming in from other nations as well.

On the training side, we’ve got that second class of more than 50 Ukrainian military. They’re — they’re now, I think, in day three of their training outside Ukraine. There’s additional howitzer training for more additional Ukrainians, almost 100 more getting howitzer training at — at a different location outside Ukraine.

The — there are about 15 Ukrainians that are now in day two of a week-long course on the Q-64, and about 60 of them are — commenced training yesterday. As I said on the M113, that — that’ll be broken up, that’s a the five day thing. You’ve got about three days that are dedicated to maintaining that — that piece of gear and two days dedicated to learning how to drive it. So that’s about a five day thing and it began yesterday.

And I think I’ll stop there and we’ll take questions. Let’s see. Lita, you’re on.

Q: Hi, thanks. One quick question on the American who was apparently killed in Ukraine, Joseph Cancel Willy (sic) — or Willy Joseph. Do you have anything more on him or — and I know you had very little visibility into Americans that may have gone over there to fight but is — is there anything you are gleaning on — on that?

And then just a broader question on the training, is the U.S. helping to facilitate the movement of the Ukrainian soldiers to training? And just give us a — sort of a — a better picture of — I know you don’t want to say where it’s happening but sort of how this is being sort of constructed?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yeah, so on the — on the — on the individual killed, Lita, we don’t have any information on — on him, we — we — we just don’t. We have — we have no way of tracking individual Americans that decide to — to go fight in Ukraine.

I — let me just say what I — you know, our — our — our thoughts and — and — and prayers go out to his family. We understand from press reporting that — you know, that he — that he was married and — and had a — a — a young child, and that’s — that’s just horrible — horrible news for any family to get. And — and the — and the Department of Defense sends its deepest condolences to all his family and — and loved ones.

We — we continue to urge Americans not to go to Ukraine. It is an active war zone. This is not the place and it’s not the time for Americans to travel to Ukraine, no matter how altruistic they may be. Now, what we would encourage Americans to do is contribute to any number of non-governmental and non-profit organizations that are trying to contribute to humanitarian assistance there — Red Cross is a great example. If you want to help Ukraine as a private citizen, that’s the best way to do that.

On your other question, without getting into too many specific details — and I’m not going to if pressed — I’m just not going to go there, guys — but yes, we have, in — in many cases, helped with the transportation of Ukrainian soldiers to training sites, not helping them get out of Ukraine.

So I do not want to leave you with the impression that we’re going into Ukraine and we’re flying — we’re transporting Ukrainian soldiers out of the country. That is not happening. But once they are out of the country, in the past, in certain circumstances, we have helped get them to their training locations and we will assist in — in getting them from those training locations back to a position where they can reenter Ukraine.

We are not — not transporting soldiers from inside Ukraine out of Ukraine. We — as the President said, there’s not going to be any U.S. forces fighting in Ukraine, and so we are not — we are not participating in that, but we are helping with their — with — with some of the transportation to get them to — to training locations.

But again, let me just stress, that transportation starts and ends outside of Ukraine. Does that answer your question?

Q: Yes, on that. Do you have any sort of ballpark goal about how many Ukrainian soldiers who are looking forward to trying to train, either the U.S. or the U.S. along with allies — I mean, what — can you give us sort of a sense of the scope going forward?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We’re not being driven by a numeric — numeric goal of — of — of numbers of — of trainers. This isn’t like a — it’s not like boot camp, where you — you’ve got sort of quotas you have to meet every quarter or every year. We are working with the Ukrainians and — and — and having a collaborative discussion with them about how many trainers they want trained on a given system.

So for the radars, you just don’t need that many, and so it’s a — it’s — it’s about 15 in this first tranche. And we’ll see what the next tranches need to be. For the — for the first two tranches of artillerymen being trained, it was roughly — it was a little bit more than 50. It wasn’t exactly the same number for — for the second, as well — as it was for the first, but it was around 50. And that was a decision made in concert with the Ukrainians. I mean, obviously it’s their choice how many they send. But it — it really is driven by how many the Ukrainians want trained on a given system and how they expect to use those trainers when they — when they go back into Ukraine.

Where are they going to go?

What units are they going to train?

How many training sessions are they going to conduct, for how long?

All that’s being decided by the Ukrainians.

So we’re not driven by a numeric goal. We’re driven by meeting a capability. And that’s all been fully consulted and baked with the Ukrainians.

Now, look, it will go on for as long as it needs to go on. I mean, Secretary Austin was very clear, certainly when we were in Europe just this week, that we’re going to help get them the capabilities they need. And part of helping with that is making sure they know how to use some of the capabilities they’re not familiar with. And we’ll just keep — we’ll keep doing that for as long as we need to.

Sylvie?

Q: Sorry. Sorry. I’m here. You said that the weapons are just starting arriving. So you — do you see any effect of the — the — of the new weapons on the ground already?

Do you see any effect of, you know, the heavier weapons that you have been sending?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yeah, Sylvie, so I can’t point to specific battles in which our howitzers have been used yet. They — they’re just arriving in the country. They’re being married up now with the trainers. The Ukrainians would have a much better sense of — of how their training is going in there and the degree to which these howitzers have been used.

I — I hasten to remind everybody that, once we transfer these systems into Ukraine, they are Ukrainian property. And the Ukrainians determine where they are, how they’re used and — and to what affect, not the United States. And we don’t have — you know, we don’t have an ability to know where every single system is, on any given day, and the degree to which it’s being effective. So I would refer you to the Ukrainian armed forces to speak to specifically the howitzers. All I can tell you is that — that — that, you know, 60 percent of — of the 90 that we committed to are in the — are in the country. And — and I can’t — I honestly just can’t go further than that.

And we do believe that — I will say this, we do believe that these howitzers will be, when applied, can be very, very effective in helping them in the Donbas fight, which we’ve already seen is deeply reliant on long-range fires, specifically artillery, by both sides. So we — we firmly believe that these howitzers, once put in the fight, will be effective in the fight.

David Martin?

Okay, nothing heard. Tony Capaccio?

Q: Hi, there. What — when will the DOD detail the $16 billion portion of the supplemental?

How and when will it be made public, sir?

Is the comptroller going to be sending a letter to the defense committees, or how is it going to work out?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I — I don’t have an update for you on what communication the comptroller’s going to have with Congress on this, Tony.

I mean, obviously we need to get it approved so we can start to fill it out. I suspect that we will already be doing some — some pen-to-paper work on what we would want in the — in both the — in both the $6 billion for USAI and what we would want to purchase, as well as the $5 billion for — for PDA and what would come into that.

I — I know that there are planners that are starting to put pen to paper on what that — what specific systems — but we don’t want to get too far ahead, either, because we don’t know when Congress will approve it or even, quite frankly, if they’ll approve it. And we want to make sure that, as we fill these out, we’re doing it in concert with the Ukrainians and they need in the moment, or what — or for the future moment.

And so our focus right now is on completing PDA-8 and — and having continued conversations with them about their — their needs going forward.

So I’m afraid I just don’t have a specific update for you, but I can assure you that we are already beginning to think about what — what kinds of systems could be in there.

But, again, we won’t make those decisions unilaterally. We’ll make them in concert, full concert with the Ukrainians.

Q: Okay, a lot of — lot of attention on the howitzers. At this point, can you say, though, that they haven’t actually started firing on Russian forces and that the artillery duel, so to speak, is yet to come?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Tony, as I said to Sylvie, we — we simply don’t know. We just don’t know. And I can’t tell you that we — that we will know, unless in fact the Ukrainians tell us, “Hey, we used your howitzer in — in a certain location, at a certain time, with a certain effect.”

But we — we may not have that kind of granularity, Tony.

Q: Sure, and one other thing. What’s the status of the delivery of the 700 Switchblades and the 121 Ghost — Phoenix Ghost drones that have been committed to the Ukraine?

And have — have Ukrainian soldiers actually been trained on the Ghost Phoenix at this point — Phoenix Ghost?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yeah, I think that, as far as I know, there hasn’t been — there hasn’t been training on the — on the Phoenix Ghost yet. We — again, we believe that a first tranche of those drones should be arriving in the region today, but not all 121, but a first tranche of them will be arriving in — in the region today.

And, again, we’re still working out how the specific training is going to be done on this. We don’t believe that the training will —

(CROSSTALK)

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Tony, just let me finish for a second. We don’t believe that the training will take very long for — for pilots that have some existing UAS knowledge. It shouldn’t take very long.

Q: And the Switchblades, the 700 that have been committed? What’s the status of those, roughly?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I don’t have an update for you on that.

Q: Okay, thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Well, actually, let me just —

Q: Yeah, if you — go through your cheat sheet there.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Thank you for giving me that permission.

So total, right now, we’re still at 100 of the Switchblades.

Q: Okay, thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yeah. Okay, Phil Stewart?

Q: Hey. There was a German magazine report saying that U.S. special forces were inside Ukraine training Ukrainians on urban warfare techniques. Just double-checking, are there any — has there been any change to the disposition, the idea that U.S. forces are allowed or not allowed to go into Ukraine to do training?

Thanks.

(AUDIO GAP)

Q: We can’t hear anything, by the way.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Can you guys hear me now?

Q: Now we can.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Hello?

(CROSSTALK)

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: — what the hell happened there. Phil, did you get my answer?

Q: No, no, no, no. I thought maybe the question was, like, you know, a — a shocker and the systems went down.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No, it wasn’t a shocker. I guess the system screwed up. What I was saying is there are no U.S. forces training in Ukraine.

Q: Thanks so much.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Okay. Eric Schmitt?

Q: Two questions. You said in your introductory comments that the Russians are behind schedule in what they’re trying to achieve in the Donbas. How far behind schedule are they, in your estimate? And what had the Pentagon — what have they thought they would have been able to achieve by this point? Then I’ve got a — one more question.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I’d say, just in general, we’d assess, cause it’s different on every line of — of approach, Eric, but I think you’re — be fine if you said that we believe they’re at least several days behind where they wanted to be. But again, it varies on the line, whether it’s from the north or the south.

And we — we believe that they — they — they meant to be much further along, in terms of a total encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the east, and they have not been able to link north with south. In fact, they’re nowhere close to linking north with south as the Ukrainians continue to fight back.

Q: And the second question is there was a statement out of NATO I think overnight or early this morning about over the past four days, NATO aircraft have gone up to intercept Russian warplanes in both the Baltic and Black Seas. No contact made but just wanted to get your sense of what this means at this time, over the last four days, of the significance of these — of these intercepts? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yeah, I — I — I checked on this myself. I — I’ve learned that NATO has offered an additional statement, making it clear that — that all these — these interchanges were safe and professional. There was no threat by Russian aircraft to — to NATO airspace or NATO territory, that these were more normal intercepts. And again, you know, the NATO air policing effort is long longstanding, years long, and there’s routine interchanges with — with Russian aircraft as a result of that air policing mission.

And the indications that I’ve gotten this morning is that — that those — those exchanges in the last 24 hours were also kind of akin to that safe and professional, did not pose a threat.

Felicia Schwartz?

Q: Thanks. Can you update us on Russia’s nuclear posture amid renewed threats from Putin this week? What’s the latest U.S. assessment on whether Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We continue to monitor their nuclear capabilities every day the best we can and we do not assess that there is a threat of the use of nuclear weapons and no threat to NATO territory. And the last thing I will say is that as he does every day, the — the Secretary assesses our own strategic deterrent posture and he has seen no reason to change that strategic deterrent posture.

Lara Seligman?

Q: Hey. Thanks for doing this. I just wanted to ask you a big picture question. Just given what you’ve been saying about the logistical issues that Russia has been having with logistics and PGMs, how does the Pentagon assess broadly that the — the fight in the Donbas is going for Ukraine? Do you assess that they’re going to continue to be able to hold against Russia? And can you give us any details of — for how long you think this might last?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: It’s very difficult, Lara, to — to predict with certainty the future of war. I — I — I think any — anybody here would — would — would be humble about that. And it’s very hard to make specific predictions about a war we’re not fighting.

I would just tell you that the Ukrainians continue to resist effectively in the Donbas. We — you know, one of the reasons why we think they’re — the Russians are behind schedule is because of the Ukrainian resistance. And we’re doing everything we can, as well as, you know, 40 other nations, to help the Ukrainians continue that — that — that defense.

Now, look, we’ve also been honest about now that the fighting has shifted to the Donbas, an area which is more confined geographically, where they have shorter lines of communication — the Russians — that they have certainly superior numbers and that — that they can now — they’re trying to learn from some of their previous mistakes, that the fighting there could become prolonged. And I know everybody wants to get, you know — what does that mean? I — I — we can’t tell you, we don’t know. Weeks, months, we’re — we’re not sure.

But we — we certainly believe that the conditions are — are — could be set for a much longer slog here in — inside the Donbas, given both sides’ familiarity with the train, the long range fires that both sides are applying, the — the — the artillery action to mechanize — the — the — the propensity to be able to use mechanized maneuvers here in this part — part of Ukraine.

I mean, it could go on for some time. We’ve described it as a potential knife fight and I think it’s beginning to shape up to be exactly that.

Dan Lamothe?

Q: Good morning. Thank you. Acknowledging you don’t know where the Howitzers are once transferred, can you speak more broadly to what the counter-battery fight has looked like thus far, what you’re seeing, what you’re hearing?

And can you drill down a bit at all on what you’re seeing south of Izyum, in that area, southeast — southeast and southwest? Thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: I don’t have a whole lot on the use of artillery. Again, you know, we — we don’t have perfect visibility in every — in — in every aspect of the fight but we do see the Russians using artillery to — to — as I’ve said, to — in advance of the movement of ground forces.

But they have not been — our assessment is they have not been as effective using long range fires against the Ukrainians as they wanted to be. And — and the Ukrainians also have long range fires of their own, they have artillery, and they’re — and they’re getting now — they’ll be getting more American artillery and the trainers to go with it, to use in their defense.

So this — this could become a bit of a gun battle here and — and certainly the — the — the Russians are — are staying close to doctrine, in terms of how they’re using artillery in advance of ground movement. But I — I — you know, I just don’t have a blow-by-blow for you.

Now — and things are going on — on the — your question about moving to the south out of Izyum — so again, we — we sort of — if you draw — if — if you’re looking at Izyum, if you were to — the way I’d sort of look at this, Dan, is — is draw a line directly south from Izyum, going towards a town called Dobropillya — they — they — they clearly want to make gains going from Izyum down towards Dobropillya — actually, more to the northwest of that town. That’s that southwestern movement that we’ve been talking about.

And then — and then draw the line from Izyum at about, not quite 180 south, but maybe 170 south, a little bit to the east of south, towards Sloviansk, and they — they keep trying to move on Sloviansk, and I mentioned that earlier. But they have — they have had trouble advancing. They — they — they’re — they’re trying hard. They — they don’t want to get ahead of their supply lines. The Ukrainians are pushing back, and so their advance towards the Sloviansk area — Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, that — sort of that little — that little axis right there. They haven’t made much progress.

And then if I — and then draw another line out of Izyum just a little bit south of east towards a town called Lyman, L-Y-M-A-N, Lyman, which is where they’re also trying to advance to. But again, they — they have made — but — but — but plodding progress there. They’re not — they’re not moving very fast. A few kilometers a day is about the most they can handle because they’re getting pushed back, and because they’re — again, they’re wary of getting out ahead of their supply lines.

So that’s sort of the push out of Izyum, and that’s really, I mean, there is some push from a town called Kreminna, where we do believe the Russians have possession of that, which is, if you look at Lyman on a map and you look not due — directly due east, but a little bit to the northeast, you’ll see this town of Kreminna — I’m — I’m probably butchering how to pronounce that, and we do believe the Russians are in control of that, and they are — they — they want to move from Kreminna west towards Lyman. So Lyman is definitely in — in their target sites, but again, they haven’t really been able to get much beyond Kreminna. Again, they’re — the Ukrainians are up there. They’re in that area and they’re fighting back bravely.

And it’s the best I can do. I mean, I — I just don’t have a — you know, we just don’t have a fingertip feel for every single scrap on any given day, but — but that’s what the map looks like right now.

Courtney?

QUESTION: Hi. Just one on the — the announcement from the White House yesterday. Have you guys gotten any more clarity that — on the — any specifics on the accelerated cyber capabilities against air defense systems? You know, we — I — I know the secretary talked a little bit about it yesterday, and you mentioned specifically yesterday the — the S300s. Is there talk about sending THAAD or Patriots or something like that? And then, what is accelerated cyber capabilities even mean? Thank you.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: We’re just talking about being able to — to continue to help Ukraine improve their cyber resilience, and some of those funds will be dedicated to — to ongoing — will — will be additional to ongoing efforts to improve the Ukrainians’ cyber — cyber defense and resilience capabilities, and I don’t think we want to get into more than that. And I think the secretary answered the advanced air systems, air defense systems pretty well yesterday. I — I don’t want to go beyond what he said yesterday. I think — I think he captured it pretty well.

QUESTION: I guess what I’m trying to figure out, though, is do you — do you expect that the U.S. is going to start giving the Ukrainians some U.S. air defense systems, advanced air defense systems?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: There’s no — there’s no active discussion about that right now, other than — other than, of course, Stingers, short-range air defense. But in the long term — in the — in long-range air defense, what we are focused on, as the secretary said, was on helping them get the kinds of systems that they — that they know how to use effectively and — and are familiar with, and I don’t have any indications that — that right now, we’re prepared to go beyond that.

QUESTION: Okay, thanks.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Jennifer Griffin? Jen, you there? Yeah, maybe we lost Jen.

Heather from USNI?

QUESTION: Thanks so much. So I know that there’s no maritime updates in the Black Sea area, but I was wondering if you’ve seen any accumulation of Russian warships in the Mediterranean that suggest that they might be trying to get war ships into the Black Sea.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No, I — I don’t think we have any — any updates in the — in their Med posture that would — I’m looking now at the maritime stuff. We’re not — no. We’re not — we’re not seeing anything in their — in their Med maritime posture that — that give us immediate concern that they’re putting more in the Black Sea, no.

Jack Detsch?

QUESTION: Sorry, on mute. I was wondering if you have anything on the reports about Valery Gerasimov, the — the Russian chief of staff either being in the field in Ukraine taking over as theater commander or assisting in, apparently, this — this Russian move out of Belgorod.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: No, I mean, we — you know, we’ve seen the rumors, but we’re — we — we have nothing to comment on or confirm with that.

QUESTION: Got it. And then have you heard anything about the — the Russians massing more forces around Kharkiv to — to move further south?

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: The — let me — let me check that. Hold on a second. Kharkiv — not ready for a question on Kharkiv, Jack. Let’s see if I’ve got something on that.

QUESTION: Yeah, the — the reporting we’ve seen was they were southeast of — of Kharkiv for — for another drive. I’m sorry.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: That — that they are southeast of Kharkiv?

QUESTION: Yeah, about 75 miles.

SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIAL: Yeah, so what we’re showing — and again, not — not perfect, but we — we — we do show some — some kinetic activity, in other words, some — some strike activity around Kharkiv. Our assessment is that the Ukrainians continue to mount a strong — what we are referring to as a strong resistance in Kharkiv and the surrounding area. So they’re — the — the — we assess that the Ukrainians are in control of Kharkiv, but they’re — but they — but they have faced some stiffer Russian activity both in terms of bombardment and — and — and still — still Russian forces around Kharkiv, but they’re — but they’re pushing back. So that’s the best I can do, I’m afraid.

What — what we — what I — maybe what you were asking is are we seeing any big movement from the Russians out of Kharkiv on sort of a — a line of access, and the answer to that would be no.

Okay, I think that’s about it for today, guys.

Out here.

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M777 Artillery Deliveries Should Help Ukraine in the Donbas, Says Official

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M777 Artillery Deliveries Should Help Ukraine in the Donbas, Says Official
April 29, 2022 | By David Vergun
Shipments of U.S.-made M777 155 mm howitzers continue to arrive in Ukraine, a senior Defense Department official said during a news conference with the press today.

About 60% of the 90 howitzers planned for delivery are now in Ukraine, the official said, along with 155 mm rounds.

“We do believe that these howitzers will be … very, very effective in helping in the Donbas fight, which we’ve already seen, is deeply reliant on long-range fires, specifically artillery by both sides,” the official said.

“We certainly believe that the conditions could be set for a much longer slog here inside the Donbas given both sides’ familiarity with the terrain,” the official said. “We’ve described it as a potential knife fight, and I think it’s beginning to shape up to be exactly that.”

The reason that it seems that the fighting in the Donbas could go on a long time, the official said, is because the Russians have shorter lines of supply and communications, as well as superior numbers. The Russians are also trying to learn from their previous mistakes and are advancing cautiously.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are putting up stiff and effective resistance as well as employing their own artillery, the official said.

In the next 24 hours, more than a dozen flights are expected from the United States and that will include more howitzers and 155 mm rounds.

Other items in this shipment will be Phoenix Ghost Tactical unmanned aerial systems and radars, the official said.

In the last 24 hours, there have been almost 20 deliveries via airlift from seven nations that have been received in the region at multiple locations. The shipments include mines, small-caliber rounds, 122 mm rockets, helmets and body armor, the official said.

Since Ukrainian forces don’t have M777 artillery in their inventory, the U.S. is training Ukrainians on the use of these weapons in undisclosed areas outside of Ukraine, the official said.

Other U.S. systems the Ukrainians will be trained on include the Phoenix Ghost Tactical UAS and M113 armored personnel carriers, the official said.

In the past, this official has noted that these are train-the-trainer sessions, which means they take their knowledge back to Ukraine to conduct their own training.

As for current Russian movements, the official said that the Russians are at least several days behind where they want it to be.

“We believe that they meant to be much further along in terms of a total encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the east and they have not been able to link north with south. In fact, they’re nowhere close to linking north with south as the Ukrainians continue to fight back,” the official said.

“One of the reasons why we think that the Russians are behind schedule because of the Ukrainian resistance,” the official said, noting that the U.S. and 40 other nations are helping the Ukrainians continue that defense.

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